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Private Information, Human Capital, and 
Optimal “Home Bias” in Financial Markets
* 
 
By allowing for imperfectly informed markets and the role of private information, we offer new 
insights about observed deviations of portfolio concentrations in domestic relative to foreign 
risky assets, or “home bias”, from what standard finance models predict. Our model ascribes 
the “bias” to endogenous information acquisition bolstered by investors’ human capital. We 
develop discriminating hypotheses about the influence of “specific” and “general” human 
capital endowments and direct and opportunity costs of managing risky assets in determining 
whether to hold these assets, and how the assets’ portfolio shares vary across investors and 
financial markets. These hypotheses are supported by numerical and econometric analyses 
of panel data from the US over 1992-2007, and 23 international financial markets over 2001-
2007. The results indicate the existence of differences across countries in the degree to 
which home asset prices are “information-revealing”, which may be relevant for fully 
understanding the global financial crisis of 2007-09. 
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Introduction  
  
Recent literature has offered new insights concerning deviations of portfolio 
compositions and related financial market characteristics from what standard finance models 
predict, by allowing for imperfectly informed markets and the role of private information (see 
Bacchetta and Van Wincoop 2006, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp [VV], 2009, and Ehrlich, 
Hamlen and Yin [EHY], 2008). Like EHY, we view equilibrium prices of risky assets as less than 
fully information-revealing, private information production as an endogenous variable, and 
heterogeneity in individual human capital endowments as a major determinant of observed 
variability in risky asset holdings, portfolio returns, market risk premiums, and market volatility. 
Our paper expands the single risky asset ─ multiple investors framework of EHY (2008) 
to one that includes multiple risky assets and diverse investors who differ in both “specific” and 
“general” human capital. “Specific” human capital relates to endowed or predetermined 
knowledge that enhances one’s efficiency in producing information about specific individual 
assets, whereas “general” human capital relates to predetermined knowledge that increases one’s 
efficiency in producing private information for all risky assets. Both act as complementary 
efficiency parameters that enable investors to form private forecasts which increase information 
precision, i.e., the posterior inverse variance of the forecasted future returns on specific risky 
assets, conditional on information signals.  
We call this activity “asset management”. Its optimal allocation across specific assets, 
and thus the precision of private information it produces, is determined by the individual human 
capital endowments as well as the direct and opportunity costs of individual asset management.
1 
Higher information precision concerning an asset lowers the investor’s required rate of return on, 
and thus the demand for that asset. Higher average precision concerning a specific asset – 
representing the aggregate precision of private information acquired by all investors – increases 
the asset price’s “informativeness”, or what we prefer to term price information content (PIC), i.e.,   2
the extent to which the price reveals information. An asset’s PIC thus acts like an implicit public 
information signal which is uniformly available to all investors. The demand for risky assets at 
both the individual and market levels is affected by the interaction between the public and private 
signals associated with each asset, as well as the signals’ relative magnitudes. 
A natural application of this approach is rationalizing evidence on apparent concentration 
of portfolio holdings in specific asset categories, such as domestic vs. foreign assets, or assets of 
specific domestic industries, relative to what would be expected by a conventional CAPM 
framework. This “excessive concentration” has been dubbed “home bias” in international markets, 
or “home bias at home” favoring specific industries or firms within a national market. In this 
paper we focus on international home bias. In our approach, however, the “bias” is nothing but an 
optimal concentration level – the outcome of endogenously determined private information.  
The issues tackled by our model are not new. The basic equilibrium framework we use, 
of imperfectly-informed markets and heterogeneous investors possessing private information, has 
been developed in Verrecchia (1982) and Admati (1985). These studies assume, however, that 
information costs or private information bundles are exogenously given. The “home bias” puzzle 
has also occupied the attention of a vast literature over the last four decades. Conventional 
explanations tended to emphasize the influence of institutional barriers to capital mobility, or 
variations in costs and benefits of diversification, across international markets on home bias (for 
detailed literature reviews, see, e.g., Lewis, 1999, and Sercu and Vanpée, 2007). These 
explanations have become less convincing with the development of a more integrated financial 
industry which provides increasingly inexpensive vehicles to facilitate global diversification.
2  
More recent studies, however, notably VV(2009) offer insights about home bias that are 
more in line with the thrust of our model, using an alternative approach. They too argue that 
home bias reflects endogenously determined private information differentials across investors. In 
their analysis, however, investors have different initial priors about asset returns, and the   3
information production function they rely on exhibits increasing returns to scale. Thus, home 
investors completely specialize in acquiring private information about either domestic or foreign 
assets. Also, while VV back their analysis by stylized facts, they do not offer systematic empirical 
tests to explain the pattern of observed diversities in home bias at the individual or market levels. 
Our model allows for interior solutions in asset management and private information precision 
and offers testable propositions concerning variations in “home bias” as a function of identifiable 
determinants of private information acquisition and the demand for risky assets. 
Following the noisy-prices, rational expectations literature, we develop a two-period 
model with multiple risky assets traded in an integrated world financial exchange. While sharing 
identical prior beliefs about the distribution of the returns on all stocks, our investors differ by 
their endowments of general and specific human capital. We view specific human capital as 
encompassing knowledge of country specific characteristics such as language, cultural heritage, 
and the country’s political, economic, and legal systems, which generate a comparative advantage 
to domestic investors in accessing private information about their home-country assets than about 
other countries’ assets. Prior empirical studies confirm the role of such factors in portfolio 
decisions (e.g. La Porta et al 1998; Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001; Massa and Simonov 2006).  
The novelty of our analysis, however, comes from our focus on variations in endowments 
of general human capital, which are captured by individual and average schooling attainments, on 
the assumption that formal schooling, producing basic knowledge and cognitive skills, is common 
to all countries. General human capital augments the productivity of specific human capital in 
generating information about both domestic and foreign risky assets. This allows us to develop 
testable propositions concerning variations in the optimal portfolio concentrations by individual 
investors in the same country, and by representative investors in different countries. 
Our key propositions relate to the determinants of the absolute levels of demand for 
domestic and foreign assets, as well as their portfolio shares at both the individual and market 
levels. At the individual level, we show that general human capital increases the optimal demand,   4
thus absolute holding, of both domestic and foreign assets. Whether the ratio of domestic relative 
to foreign assets in the individual portfolio also rises with the investor’s general human capital 
depends on market-level variables, including the gap between the price-information-content (PIC) 
of domestic vs. foreign assets, PICd - PICf . All other determinants of optimal asset management 
held constant, if PICd  greatly exceeds PICf, for example, we expect individual portfolio 
concentrations in home assets to be a decreasing function of individual schooling attainments. In 
other cases, however, home bias could be monotonically increasing in schooling attainments.  
At the market level, by contrast, the average information precision and PIC for domestic 
and foreign assets are endogenously determined. It is natural to assume that the representative 
domestic investor in all countries has a higher level of specific human capital concerning home 
assets, relative to foreign assets. All other determinants of asset management held constant, our 
model implies that the equilibrium portfolio concentration in domestic assets, or “home bias” 
must be an inverted-U-shaped function of the average schooling attainments of domestic 
investors in all countries. The rationale is that an upward shift in a country’s average general 
human capital is likely to induce greater asset management and private information precision 
about the home asset when the public information signal in the home country, PICd , is lower than 
that in foreign countries. As average human capital and PICd increases, however, the return on 
further managing domestic relative to foreign assets gets diluted. Beyond a critical level of 
average schooling and PIC, optimal asset management shifts toward foreign assets and “home 
bias” begins to fall systematically as average schooling continues to rise. Indeed, as PIC 
approaches an infinite value, prices become fully revealing and “home bias” disappears altogether.  
Our model thus produces discriminating implications about the determinants of variations 
of portfolio concentrations across both individual investors in given countries and representative 
investors across countries. It also provides a uniform framework to explain corresponding 
diversities in risk premiums, volatility contagion, and returns to human capital in managing assets 
across international markets. We allude to these implications in the concluding section.    5
  The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 introduces our analytical framework. 
Section 2 develops our basic optimization and equilibrium analysis. Sections 3 and 4 offer 
testable propositions at the micro- and macro- levels, respectively, and sections 4 and 5 present 
empirical evidence consistent with these propositions. Section 7 discusses alternative hypotheses 
and assesses the information costs bearing on Home bias. We end with concluding remarks. 
 
1. The Model 
Our model generalizes Verrecchia (1982) and EHY (2008) to a multiple-asset, 
heterogeneous investors framework. Individual investors operate in m countries with competitive 
exchange economies and corresponding financial markets. Each country has one distinct risky 
asset or country mutual fund and includes a large number of investors who can trade in all 
countries’ assets. We assume that markets are fully integrated with no capital controls, so asset 
prices are equalized across all markets. Country k  has  k N  investors so  k
m
k N N ∑ ≡ =1  denotes the 
total number of world investors. Investors’ heterogeneity stems from variations in human capital 
endowments, wage earnings, initial wealth, and countries of residence. 
Investors live over two periods. In the first period they search for information signals and 
allocate their portfolios among competing domestic and foreign assets, and in the second they 
realize portfolio returns, which are used to finance consumption. Portfolio decisions are thus 
influenced by two major information channels: One is public, conveyed by assets’ market prices 
as signals. The other is a private channel empowered by individually acquired information signals. 
The initial financial wealth of investor i in each country is comprised of risk-free bonds, 
0 i B  traded at a normalized price of unity, and a vector of risky assets, 
i x ~  traded at world prices. 
The per capita supply of the risky asset k  is given by  k x ~ . The country’s mutual fund k  is traded 
at equilibrium price  k P
~
 in the first period and pays off a gross return of  k μ ~  in the second period.   6








2 1 ′ ≡ m P P P P . 
Similarly,  )' ~ ,..., ~ , ~ ( ~
2 1 m μ μ μ μ =  and 
i N
i N x x ~ ~
1
1 ∑ = =  =  )' ~ ,..., ~ , ~ ( 2 1 m x x x   denote the vectors of assets’ 
return and per capita supplies of each of the m risky assets, respectively.  
Although the realizations of return and supply are unobservable until the second period, 
their prior joint distribution is commonly known to all investors. The vector of returns μ ~  follows 
a normal distribution with mean μ  and variance μ Σ . The supply of risky assets x ~  is normally 
distributed with mean x  and  variance x Σ . For simplicity, we assume that μ ~  and  x ~ are 
uncorrelated and  x Σ  is a diagonal matrix.
3  The assumed existence of random exogenous supply 
shocks is critical in the analysis, because such shocks cannot be forecasted through search for 
information signals.  Thus, the market prices of risky assets become “noisy” – they cannot fully 
reveal the private information held by each investor, which in turn generates incentives for 
investors to collect costly private information. 
The objective of information collection, or asset management, is to generate a forecast of 
returns based on the observed asset prices and moments of the unconditional distributions of 
future returns known to all investors, plus private information signals that lower forecast errors. 
The ( 1 × m ) vector of private forecasts acquired by investor i,  i z ~ , is unbiased but imperfectly 




i S N   and is uncorrelated with both μ ~  and  x ~ .  i S   is our measure of private information 
precision. For analytical simplicity, we assume that  i S  is a diagonal matrix and  i ε ~  is independent 
of  j ε ~  for all  j i ≠ , i.e., that elements of the vector of forecast errors ε ~ are uncorrelated across 
both investors and assets. Investors do not have any control over the actual realization of the   7
private forecast,  i z ~ . They can increase the magnitude of each diagonal entry in the precision 
matrix  i S , however, by engaging in costly asset management activities.   
Investori’s human wealth consists of an ( ) 1 1 × + m  vector of human capital endowments 
containing both “general” and “country specific” elements, denoted by  []
′ = m i i i i H H H H , 1 , 0 , ,..., , , 
and T hours of productive time.  0 , i H  denotes an endowment of general human capital of investor 
i   and its cumulative density function is defined over the compact set [] 1 , 0 ] , [ : → H H F . 
4 
General human capital, which we proxy empirically as education, or formal schooling, stands for 
predetermined extra-territorial knowledge which augments the efficiency of all productive 
activities in all countries; it increases the investor’s labor market skills, hence the market wage 
rate, as well as the efficacy of acquiring private information about all risky assets - both domestic 
and foreign. By contrast, individual specific human capital endowments associated with country 
k’s home asset,  k i H , ,  0 ≠ k , represent the predetermined knowledge that improves the efficiency 
of acquiring private information just about that country’s asset. At the international level the 
endowed specific human capital corresponds to the knowledge of specific country attributes such 
as cultural heritage, language, politics, economy, legal system and institutions. 
5  
Several aspects of our concept of “specific human capital” should be flashed out. First, it 
does not need to be comparable across countries. This is partly because we do not have a good 
proxy measure for the importance of command over language, communication ability, or cultural 
awareness in different countries. It is more like a country-based social capital. Indeed, whether 
k i H , is equal to or different from  l j H , (where j refers to residents of country l) has no bearing on 
any of our behavioral propositions. We do assume, however, as is plausible, that the average 
investor in each country is significantly more knowledgeable about her home asset (k) than about 
foreign assets (l ), i.e.  l i k i H H , , >  (  l k ≠  ). Second, by our interpretation of specific human   8
capital, its endowment measure  k i H ,  can be thought of as largely uniformly distributed across all 
investors within a country, although its effectiveness is influenced the individual level of general 
human capital endowments, as defined by equation (1a) below.  
Individuals can allocate their endowed productive time T   between two sectors: the labor 
market and the household sector, where they search and acquire private information signals 
(leisure is subsumed under final-period consumption). Specifically, productive time is allocated 
between the management of each asset k ,  k i q , , and labor hours,  i q T −  where  k i
m
k i q q , 1 ∑ ≡ =  
denotes the total asset management time of investor i. The production function of information 
precision by investor i for home-asset k is assumed to be of a Cobb-Douglas type: 
( 1 a )         
3 2 1
, 0 , , ,
θ θ θ
k i i k i k i H H Aq S =  
where  A stands for technological factors facilitating private information acquisition,  1 0 1 ≤ <θ  , 
0 2 > θ  and  0 3 > θ  . The actual asset management time employed is 
(1b)      ( ) ( ) [ ]
1 3 2
/ 1
, 0 , , , , /
θ θ θ
k i i k i k i k i H AH S S q q = ≡  
Hence, the total cost of asset management function,  ( ) i i H S C ;  , is given by 
(1c)      () () 0 , . 0 ,
1
) ( ) , ( ; k k i i i i
m
k
i i i C S q H w H S C C + = ≡ ∑
=
λ  
where  0 , k C  is a fixed cost associated with the management of risky asset k , and  ) , ( 0 , i i i H w λ  is 
investor i’s wage rate which is a function of both general human capital and job-related factors .
6 
We assume that  i w  is uncorrelated with asset returns, partly because there is no consensus in the 
literature regarding the direction of this correlation, but mainly in order to focus on the 
contribution of human capital to information production. (We return to this issue in section 6.) 
Information costs are a convex function of private information i S , as  1 0 1 ≤ <θ .    9
The market value of investori’s initial wealth is  ) , ( ~
0 , 0 0 i i i
i
i i H Tw x P B W λ + ′ + = . The 
decision rule in our model is maximization of the expected utility of second-period (final) wealth, 
or consumption, 1 1
~
i i i B D W + =
′ μ , where  i D  and  1 i B  denote, respectively, the demand for risky 
assets and the risk-free bond by investor i. The utility function is assumed to be exponential, 
with a common risk-tolerance coefficient, r . The investor’s objective is thus 
(2)        
{} ( ) [ ], / exp max 1
, , 1
r W E i
B D S i i i
− −  
subject to the initial periods budget constraint  
( 2 a )        0 1
~
i i i i W C B D P = + +
′ . 
The assumed exponential utility function, or constant absolute risk aversion, is standard 
in the literature because of its computational advantage: it allows for closed form solutions, as 
wealth is normally distributed. As is well-known, however, this function does not allow for any 
pure wealth effects. Thus, if we assume a common risk tolerance, r, to focus on variation in 
opportunities, not preferences, portfolio decisions would be attributable solely to diversity in 
private information, hence to varying general and specific human capital endowments.
7 
 
2. Optimization and Equilibrium analysis 
A. Optimal demand for risky assets 
The investor’s maximization problem (2) can be decomposed heuristically into two 
stages by the law of iterated expectation, although both parts are solved simultaneously. In the 
second stage the investor solves for an optimal demand for the m risky assets in the portfolio, 
subject to both the implicit public information signal within the market price and the private 
information signal produced by optimal asset management. In the first part the optimal demand 
for assets the investor relies on her optimal demand rule to solve for optimal private information 
collection or “asset management”. The general maximization problem can be stated as follows:   10
(3)    
{} {} () []
{} {} () {} () [] ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
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where  [] P z E i
i , ~ μ μ =  and X E ~  denotes an expectation operator defined over the distribution of 
a random variable X
~
 and  i z  and P  denote the realizations of  i z ~  and P
~
, respectively. Equation 
(3) is restated alternatively to be maximized over just Si and Di using equation (2a). 
In solving the second stage maximization problem in (3) – determining the optimal 
demand for m risky assets conditional on optimal asset management – we invoke (and prove) the 
existence of a rational expectations-asset market equilibrium as stated in previous literature (e.g., 
Admati 1985, Verrecchia and Kim 1991, and EHY 2008). Investors are assumed to follow a 
linear conjecture concerning the properties of the equilibrium price,  
(3a)        x P ~ ~ ~
2 1 0 φ μ φ φ − + =  ,  
By the linear conjecture, the joint distribution of   )
~
, ~ , ~ ( P zi μ  is normal. In this case, investors’ 
conditional demand for risky assets is thus given by  
(4a)           () [ ] ( ) P P z E rV P z D D i i i i − = ≡
− , ~ ,
~ 1 μ ,   where 
(4b)             ( ) ( )
1 1 2 1 , ~ − − − Σ + + Σ = ≡ S S r S P z Var V x i i i μ μ  
(4c)                P z P z E i i i i i 2 1 0 ] , ~ [ η η η μ + + =  and 









1 ∫ ∑ = ≡
=
  
Equation (4b) implies that the gap between the prior variance of the returns on risky assets, 
1 − ∑μ , 
and the lower posterior variance, Vi , as perceived by the informed investor is affected by both the   11
private information signal, Si, and the implicit public signal,  S S r x
1 2 − ∑ , reflecting the mean 
private information level about the asset. We term the latter “price information content”, or PIC.
8 





1 = ∑ = , we can show that in equilibrium, the 
coefficient matrices φ ’s and η ’s in equations (3a) and (4c) represent a consistent solution  (see 
Appendix A.1 for the exact expressions of φ ’s and η ’s). This indicates that the equilibrium 
outcome is indeed a rational-expectation-equilibrium.
9  
From (4a) and (4b), investor i’s expected excess demand (over per-capita supply) for 
risky asset k  is 
(5a)     ( ) k k k k A k i k i k i x P E S S r D E D + − − = ≡ ]
~ ~ [ ]
~
[ , , , , μ              for all i, k 
where   
(5b)     [] ( ) x S S r S P E x r
1 1 2 1 1 ~ ~ − − − Σ + + Σ = − μ μ    
and  k A S ,  denotes the 
th k  diagonal entry of average precision of private information concerning 
asset k, and  i
N
i N A S S S ∑ = ≡ =1
1 . Investor i’s expected demand for asset k in equation (5a) has a 
few immediate implications. First, the expected demand for each risky asset consists of two 
components: one that is driven by private information,  ( ) ]
~ ~ [ , , , k k k A k i k k i P E S S r x D − − = − μ  and 
another that includes elements common to all investors,  ]
~ ~ [ k k P E − μ and k x . Note that if Si,k = 
SA,k , the expected individual demand would just equal the asset’s expected supply, and thus be 
identical across all investors in all markets, as predicted by CAPM. Second, the component of 
demand driven by private information is proportional to  k A k i S S , , −  or the information advantage 
of investor i relative to the world’s average investor. Third, the deviation between the average 
supply of asset k per investor and the expected demand for k by investor i,  k k i x D − , , is 
proportional to the expected excess return on k,  ]
~ ~ [ k k P E − μ .   12
 B. Optimal Demand for Private Information and Asset Management   
Having solved for optimal demand conditional on available information precision, we can 
now shift attention to the first stage of the maximization problem (3) - the determination of the 
optimal asset management. In the following analysis we focus on the demand for the optimal 
information precision for asset k, Si,k , rather than its optimal “management”, i.e., the allocation of 
time to search for and apply information signals, qi,k , essentially for expositional convenience. 
The derived-demand for asset management time can then be inferred from the solution for Si,k , 
using the production function (1). The closed-form solution for optimal information precision for 
asset k, Si,k  , is given by 
























− =  
where  k i S ,  and  kk i V ,  are 
th k diagonal entries in the  i S  and  i V matrices (see Appendix A.2).
10  
Equation (6a) is a generalization of the optimal demand for private information in 
Verrecchia (1982) and EHY (2008), where k = 1. An interior optimum requires the marginal 
revenue of asset management with respect to risky assetk ,  k i MR , , to be equated to its marginal 
cost , k i MC , . Substituting (1a) ~ (1c) into (6a) yields 
(6b)    






k i k i i k i i
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Equation (6b) indicates that  k i MR ,  is proportional to investori ’s posterior variance of 
the risky assetk ’s return,  kk i V , . In other words, the marginal gain of managing a specific asset is 
highest when the investor is most uncertain about the return. Also,  k i MR , is decreasing in  k i S , , as 
more precise information reduces the posterior variance of the assets’ returns  kk i V , , while  k i MC ,    13
is non-decreasing in  k i S , , since  1 0 1 ≤ <θ . Thus, the second order optimality condition for  k i S , is 
satisfied. Equation (6b) also indicates that since the specific human capital level possessed by an 
investor concerning the home asset (d) always exceeds that concerning a foreign asset (f), or 
f i d i H H , , > , the marginal cost curve of home information production is always lower than that 
of the foreign information production.  
In the following sections, we derive the model’s behavioral implications at the micro and 
macro levels. To simplify matters, we focus on a world with just two countries and two related 
assets: a home (d) and a foreign asset (f), which can be perceived of as a value weighted fund 
consisting of all  1 − m  foreign risky assets. 
 
3. Behavioral Propositions at the Micro Level 
We begin by developing the behavioral implications of the model at the micro level. By 
assuming a large competitive economy, individual investors’ choices do not affect aggregate level 
variables such as the equilibrium price P
~
 and the average information precision, S . We focus on 
the impact of exogenous shifts in the model’s human capital and related endowments.   
a. General human capital, private information and the demand for risky asset. An increase in 
general human capital, proxied by education Hi,0, imposes opposing effects on the optimal 
demand for private information and the corresponding portfolio choices. While it raises the 
efficiency of private information acquisition for both risky assets, thus shifting the marginal cost 
curves downward (see equation (6b)), it also raises the opportunity cost of asset management,  i w , 
thus raising the marginal cost curves in the opposite direction. Formally, the net effect of an 
unconditional increase in H i,0 will increase optimal private information and the demand for all 




















H q  exceeds the elasticity of the wage with respect to general human   14











0 , 0 , , ∂
∂ ≡ ε . From equation (1a), this would be the case when the 
production of private information precision is enhanced much more by general human capital 
0 , i H  than by asset management time,  k i q , , or  1 θ  <<  2 θ  .   A conditional increase in general 
human capital at a given wage level, by comparison, will raise unambiguously the optimal private 
information and demand for all assets.  
Proposition 1: An unconditional increase in general human capital, Hi,0 , raises the 
investor’s optimal private information precision and absolute demand for risky assets provided 
that  0 ) (
0 , 0 , , > −
i i i i H w H q ε ε . A conditional increase in Hi,0 , given the opportunity cost of time, wi , 
unambiguously raises the corresponding information precision and assets’ demand. Formally,  
(7a)                 0 and 0
0 d 0 ,
,





















































   for k = d, f. 
Equations (7a) and (7b) imply that the conditional elasticities of demand for both domestic and 
risky asset with respect to investors’ schooling, given their market wage rates, should be larger in 
absolute magnitudes than the respective unconditional elasticities. This is because an 
unconditional increase in Hi,0 also increases the opportunity costs of asset management, which at 
least partially offsets the education effect.  
b. General human capital effects on portfolio concentration. Although more education increases 
the demand for all risky assets, it is not clear whether it also increases individual demand for 
domestic relative to foreign stocks,  f i d i D D , , / . 
11 A general insight into this question can be 
derived by partially differentiating equation (5a) with respect to Hi,0 as follows: 













































μ μ    15
where subscripts d and f, denote investor i’s domestic and foreign assets.   
By equation (8), three major factors determine the way the optimal portfolio 
concentration in domestic assets varies with general human capital. The first is the impact of 
education on domestic investors’ relative advantage in producing forecasts about their home asset, 
i.e., the magnitude of ( 0 , , / i d i H S ∂ ∂ ) relative to ( 0 , , / i f i H S ∂ ∂ ), which is ambiguous at the 
individual level.
12 The second is the magnitude of expected excess returns on the home, relative 
the foreign asset, ( ]
~ ~ [ d d P E − μ  vs.  ]
~ ~ [ f f P E − μ ), which is affected by the determinants of     
x S r S P E x r
1 1 2 2 1 1 ) ( ]
~ ~ [
− − − Σ + + Σ = − μ μ . The third is the investor’s initial expected demand for 
domestic, relative to foreign assets,  f i d i D D , , / , which typically exceeds 1. 
Proposition 2: The Impact of higher individual general human capital (Hi,0) on relative 
information precision and the relative demand for home vs. foreign assets (“individual home 
bias”) is generally ambiguous. Even if individuals’ relative home advantage in producing private 
information were always rising with Hi,0, and thus induced a higher concentration in home assets, 
market-level factors could offset (reinforce) this outcome. If the expected excess return on the 
domestic asset were sufficiently lower (higher) than that on the foreign asset,  ]
~ ~ [ d d P E − μ  << 
(>>)  ]
~ ~ [ f f P E − μ , “home bias” could decrease (increase) with Hi,0.   
As indicated by equation (5b), the expected excess return on any specific risky asset k, 
]
~ ~ [ k k P E − μ , is higher the higher is the asset’s prior “riskiness”, as measured by the variances of 
the asset’s return and supply, ( )
kk μ Σ  and ( )kk x Σ  respectively, but the lower is the asset’s price 
information content PICk =  ( )kk x k A kk S r
1 2
,
2 − Σ ≡ Δ , where  kk Δ  denotes  k
th diagonal entry of the 
matrix  S S r x
1 2 − Σ ≡ Δ . This is because a higher PIC for a home asset (PICd), reflecting a higher 
level of average information precision about the home asset, SA,d , lowers the perceived risk of the 
home asset. This, in turn, increases its price and lowers its excess return and thus the individuals’   16
demand for the home asset. Furthermore, a higher PICd also lowers the schedule of marginal 
benefits from “managing” the home asset, MRi,k = (r/2) Vi,dd in equation (6b), which exerts a 
negative feedback on the investor’s demand for the home asset.  Equation (8) indicates that for a 
country like the US, where stock market volatility and supply shocks are relatively low and PICd 
is relatively high owing to high schooling attainments, “individual home bias” might be a 
monotonically decreasing function of individual schooling attainments. In other countries, 
however, “individual home bias” may be monotonically increasing in schooling attainments.
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c. The impact of shifts in the opportunity costs and technology of asset management. 
 Proposition 3: (wage and technology effects) For the same reasons driving propositions 
1 and 2, a conditional increase in individual opportunity costs of asset management, wi , will 
generate opposite effects on the absolute demand for domestic and foreign assets and their 
relative portfolio concentration, or “individual home bias”, relative to the impact of a higher 
endowment of general human capital as summarized by propositions 1 and 2. A better technology 
of information collection (A in equation 1a), in contrast, will have the same qualitative effects as 
those of a higher level of general human capital, as summarized by propositions 1 and 2.  
Proposition 4: (Specific human capital effects). An upward shift in country-specific 
human capital, Hi,k , increases optimal asset management and expected demand for asset k, as 
well as asset k’s relative portfolio concentration (see Appendix A.4).  Clearly, a higher specific 
human capital  k i H , improves the efficiency of asset management concerning the home asset, and 
thereby also optimal  k i S , ,  k i D ,  and  l i k i D D , , / .  Recent studies offer supportive evidence for this 
proposition. See, e.g., Huberman (2001) and Massa and Simonov (2006).   
 
4. Behavioral Propositions at the Macro Level 
Unlike our analysis at the micro level, where both asset prices (Pk) and the degree to 
which they convey information (PICk) were taken to be given to investors, at the macro or   17
country level, both of these variables must be treated as endogenous variables. To simplify the 
analysis, we assume that each country has a continuum of identical representative investors 
whose characteristics may differ across countries. We also derive our main insights for a two-
country case: domestic (d) and foreign (f).  As in the micro section, we invoke the assumption 
that the representative investor’s specific human capital corresponding to home assets, is strictly 
larger than that which corresponds to foreign assets, or f d d d H H , , >  and  f f d f H H , , < .   
Since we retain the competitive nature of markets, our representative investors take the 
market equilibrium outcomes like price and price information content (PIC) as given. We do 
account, however, for the fact that changes in the model’s underlying parameters will change the 
market equilibrium outcomes as well. Specifically, we focus on the impact of the main 
determinants of the demand for risky assets on the absolute and relative demands for domestic 
and foreign assets on the one hand, and the assets’ market prices and PIC levels, on the other. 
Although the propositions below are expressed in terms of the impact of conditional increments 
in the average endowment of general human capital in reference countries, the qualitative impacts 
would work in the same direction for increments in technological variables which lower the costs 
of asset management, but in opposite directions as a result of conditional increments in investors’ 
average opportunity costs of time, w(H0,k, λk), in conformity with proposition 3. 
a. Variations in average precision, excess returns and price information content  
Proposition 5: (General human capital, information advantage, and PIC).  A conditional 
increase in country d’s representative investor’s general human capital,  0 , d H , with no change in 
that of country f,  0 , f H , subject to the conditions spelled out in proposition 1, increases the 
information advantage of country d’s investors concerning their home asset, relative to the 
average world investor  k A k d S S , , − , as well as the price information content of the domestic asset 
(PICd), and generally the foreign, asset (PICf) as well.
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A formal proof is offered in Appendix A.6. We here trace its logic. Initially, by 
Proposition 1, a conditional upward shift in  0 , d H increases the private information precision of all 
investors in country d, and hence their average information precision concerning both home and 
foreign assets,  k d S , , k = d, f.  The average (world) private information precision and price 
information content of asset d, and generally also of asset f ,  k A S ,  , also rise with  0 , d H (see fn. 
14).  At the same time, the average information advantage of domestic investors over the average 
world investor,  k A k d S S , , −  for k = d, f, also expands because the feedback effect of a higher PICf  
in the foreign country where general schooling remains constant, causes asset management 
activity and the information precision of asset  f  to fall.  The two upper panels in Figure 1 present 
numerical simulations showing that Sd,k – SA,k  and PICk, k =d , f,  are indeed increasing functions 
of  0 , d H  when  0 , f H  (and all other parameters) remain constant.  
Proposition 6: (General human capital, expected asset prices and expected excess returns).  
Expected prices on the home (foreign) asset d (f) are non-decreasing, and thus the excess returns 
on asset d (f) are non-increasing in the general human capital of the representative investor in 
country d (f), if the posterior covariance of returns on assets d and f is non-negative ( 0 ≥ df V ).   
Proof: Partially differentiating equation (5b) with respect to  l A S ,  yields  
(9)          ( ) ) 1 2 ](





, + Σ − − = ∂ − ∂
−
ll x l A k k kl l A k k S r P E V S P E μ μ  < 0 for k, l = d, f.   
By proposition 5, if  0 , d H  rises both  d A S ,  (PICd) and  f A S ,  (PICf)  rise.  Since Vdf ≥ 0, equation 
(9) holds.
15 Higher endowments of general human capital raise the information content of asset 
prices, which lowers their perceived risk and excess returns.   
b. Variations in expected demand for risky assets at the market level 
Proposition 7: (Direct and cross effects of Hd,0 on expected demands for assets d and f). The 
expected demands for both home (d) and foreign (f) securities by country d’s representative   19
investor are inverted-U-shaped functions of conditional increments in the investor’s general 
human capital,  0 , d H . Because of market-clearing conditions in the asset markets, in contrast, the 
expected demands for home (f) and foreign (d) securities by country f’s representative investor 
would be inverse mirror images, or U-shaped functions of the same increments in Hd,0 . 
By equation (5a), expected excess demand (over the world’s per-capita supply) for asset k 
= d, f by country d’s representative investor depends on the product of ( ) ]
~ ~ [ , , k k k A k d P E S S − − μ . 
The impact of a conditional rise in  0 , d H  (schooling) on expected excess demand thus depends on 
the way it affects these two components. By proposition 5, more schooling always raises the 
domestic investor’s information precision concerning asset k,  k d S , , which militates in favor of a 
higher expected demand for asset k. At the same time, by proposition 6, since the asset price Pk 
and its information component (PICk) also rise, the corresponding expected excess return, 
]
~ ~ [ k k P E − μ , declines. This generates an offsetting effect on the expected demand for risky assets, 
both domestic and foreign. The net effect depends on the domestic investor’s information 
advantage relative to the average world investor (i.e. the sign of  k A k d S S , , −  for k =d, f ).  By 
equation (5a), the well informed investor ( 0 , , > − k A k d S S ) reduces his demand for asset k as 
PICk increases.  This is because for that investor, the perceived risk of asset d, e.g., is already 
lower than the average investor’s, so the dominant influence of a higher PICd  is that it lowers 
excess returns on asset d.  For the less informed investor ( 0 , , < − k A k d S S ), by contrast, the 
dominant effect of a higher PICd is that it lowers asset d’s riskiness, which reinforces the effect of 
more schooling on the investor’s private information precision. The net effect on this investor 
would be an increase in expected demand for asset d. 
Figure 1 demonstrates the general pattern of results. When  0 , d H  is very low compared to 
0 , f H   the information advantage  k A k d S S , , −  is likely to be negative (upper left panel), therefore   20
k k d x D < ,  for both domestic and foreign stocks (lower right panel).  As  0 , d H  increases, both the 
information advantage of the average domestic investor and PICk increase.  They reinforce each 
other as long as  k A k d S S , , − < 0, which accelerates the increase in demand for domestic and 
foreign assets. As  0 , d H  increases sufficiently and the relative information advantage of country 
d’s investor (“agent d”), ( k A k d S S , , − ), rises above zero, the impact of the resulting higher PICk 
on the expected excess returns erodes the effect of the higher relative information advantage.  
Therefore, when PICk reaches a sufficiently high level its effect starts dominating the impact of 
the relative information advantage.  In the limit, where PICk approaches an infinite value so that 
Pk tends to become fully information revealing, asset k’s riskiness approaches zero and it’s excess 
return should approach that of the risk-free rate (lower left panel). Investors’ expected demand for 
each asset (k=d, f) should then approach the asset’s average supply, as the CAPM model would 
predict.   This analysis demonstrates why the absolute demands for both the domestic and the 
foreign asset in the reference country d are expected to be inverted-U-shaped functions of the 
general human capital of the representative investor in that country,  0 , d H .  
Since in equilibrium, the world’s (i.e., country d’s plus f’s) demands for assets d and f 
must equal the world’s supplies of these assets, the demands for foreign (f) and domestic (d) 
assets by the representative foreign investor as a function of increments in the average 
endowment of general human capital in country d (i.e., the cross effects of Hd,0) must be opposite 
mirror images of the corresponding demands by the representative investor of country d (not 
shown in Figure 1). The same holds for the relative information advantage of the foreign 
representative investor as a function of the average general human capital in country d, Hd,0 .  
c. General human capital and optimal portfolio concentrations at the country level 
Proposition 8: (Direct effects and cross effects of Hd,0 on “home bias” in markets d and f). The 
optimal portfolio concentration in the home, relative to the foreign, asset of country d’s   21
representative investor,  f d d d D D , , / , is an inverted-U-shaped function of the direct effects of 
conditional increments in the investor’s human capital endowment,  0 , d H . The same holds for the 
cross-effects of  0 , d H on the optimal portfolio concentration in the home asset of country f’s 
representative investor,  d f f f D D , , / .  However, the inflection point of the inverted-U trajectory 
of  f d d d D D , , / occurs at a lower level of  0 , d H  than that for   d f f f D D , , /  (see Figure. 2).   
When the average level of general human capital in country d,  0 , d H , is very low relative 
to  0 , f H , the average domestic investor’s relative information advantage  k A k d S S , , −  for k=d, f  is 
negative.  (The opposite is the case in country f where  k A k f S S , , − > 0.) By the analysis in the 
preceding section, an improvement in information advantage is reinforced by the impact of an 
increase in PIC on expected excess return on asset k = d, f.  Given that the representative 
investor’s specific human capital endowments are always higher for home relative to foreign 
assets ( f d d d H H , , > ), an increase in the average level of general human capital in country d, 
0 , d H , induces the average precision of both private information concerning the home asset 
( d d S , ) and the corresponding PIC ( dd Δ ) to change faster than those of the foreign counterparts 
( f d S ,  and  ff Δ ). Consequently, the portfolio concentration in country d’s home asset, 
f d d d D D , , / , first increases sharply as  0 , d H  rises from zero (see the solid line in the upper panel 
of Figure 2).  As country d’s representative investor’s education continues to rise, however, her 
private information concerning the home asset ultimately approaches that of the average world 
investor ( 0 , , > − d A d d S S ) while still being less informed concerning the foreign asset 
( 0 , , < − f A f d S S ).  When  d A d d S S , , − becomes positive, her demand for the home asset starts 
slowing down while her demand for the foreign risky asset is still enhanced by the increase in 
PICf . The ratio of her expected demand for home vs. foreign stocks thus starts falling before her   22
expected absolute demand for the home asset reaches an inflection point.  As PICd continues to 
rise when  0 , d H increases, the home bias of the domestic market keeps falling and ultimately 
approaches the level predicted by CAPM. As the solid line in the upper left panel of Fig. 2 
demonstrates,  f d d d D D , , / is an inverted-U-shaped function of  0 , d H .  
Note that while Proposition 8 defines as a measure of “home bias” the ratio of the expected 
absolute demands for the home relative to the foreign asset,  f d d d D D , , /  the conventional 
empirical measure of “home bias” has been   



















where  ) /( , k k k k k D P D P ACT ′ ≡  denotes the percent of domestic stocks in country k’s total  
portfolio of risky assets (P’Dk) while  ) /( x P x P CAPM k k k ′ ≡  is country k’s optimal portfolio 
share of asset k by CAPM, i.e., asset k’s share of the world’s market capitalization. Unlike the 
ratio of absolute demands, equation (10) captures the deviation of the actual portfolio share of the 
home asset in country k from the CAPM’s predicted share, normalized by country k’s relative 
market capitalization.  Under given average asset supplies k x , k= d,f , however, these two 
measures are monotonically related (see the broken v. solid lines in the upper panel of Figure 2). 
The Cross effects of average education in country d on country f’s home bias, measured 
as ( d f f f D D , , / ) or HomeBiasf  in equation (10), are also inverted U-shaped functions of country 
d’s general human capital,  0 , d H .  This is because the foreign investor’s absolute demand for each 
asset is a mirror image of the domestic investor’s demand for the same asset due to the market 
clearing condition.  Also, the inflection point of the home bias trajectory in country f occurs at a 
higher level of  0 , d H than that in country d, when both are depicted as functions of the same 
increments in  0 , d H , as illustrated by the upper and lower panels of Figure 2.
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5. Micro-Level Evidence 
 
The data set we use to test the micro-level implications of our model consists of six 
surveys of individual asset holdings for 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007 that are reported 
in the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) based on separate national 
probability samples.  This data source was also used in EHY (2008), but in this study we include 
only the surveys beginning in 1992, which is the first year when SCF started reporting foreign 
asset holdings. All surveys contain information about household initial portfolio composition by 
asset categories, household wage income, and personal characteristics of household heads.  
We adopt the regression specification in EHY (2008) as our baseline model to test the 
implications of propositions 1-3 concerning individual demand for domestic and foreign assets:  
(11)  lnRASSTk =  a0 + a1lnEDU + a2lnTASST+ |a3lnWAGE*| + a4AGE + a5 PROF + a6RAV  
+|a7 SELF|,  k = d, f .   
Consistent with our model, the dependent variable in this DEMAND equation is the log 
value of risky assets holdings, lnRASST, defined as all publicly tradable stocks and corporate 
bonds, which in turn are separated into domestic and foreign securities.  Implicitly, we treat the 
remainder of the portfolio as a “safe” asset. The explanatory variables account for determinants of 
productivity at, and opportunity cost of, asset management by household heads. These include, 
the household head’s number of years of schooling EDU (average schooling of husbands and 
wives yields similar results) and the predicted wage rate of the household’s head, lnWAGE*, 
discussed below.  As in the EHY (2008), we also include as a regressor, however, the investor’s 
portfolio size or nonhuman wealth in logarithmic form, lnTASST. Although our theoretical model 
rules out pure wealth effects, portfolio size may account for economies of scale in asset 
management, which lower fixed analysts or trading costs per share in domestic and international 
asset categories, as well as for investors’ experience in managing assets as an efficiency variable 
in information production (A in equation 1a). In this context, we further include an indicator of   24
“managerial and professional-specialty occupations” lumping together managers of all types; 
specialty occupations varying from speech therapists to nuclear engineers, some of which might 
be conducive to asset management (PROF); and self-employment vs. salaried status which needs 
to be examined separately for reasons we explain later in this section. Investors also provide self-
assessments of their relative risk aversion intensity (RAV), using 4 categories (1-4) in ascending 
order of risk aversion. While this may not be a reliable measure of risk tolerance, we introduce it 
as a robustness check on the validity of our hypotheses, which do not rely on differences in 
attitudes toward risk to explain risky assets demand and management. And although our model 
abstracts from life-cycle dynamics, we add the investor’s age (AGE) to account for the “vintage” 
effect of schooling or see if one’s life-cycle stage has an independent effect on demand.  
The specification of the lnWAGE* regressor warrants a short discussion. Following EHY, 
we use a projected wage rate based on Mincer’s human capital-earnings function, rather than the 
actually reported wage income for two reasons. Actual wage income is a function of labor hours, 
or (1-q) in equation 1b, which are an endogenous variable in our model. Also, for self-employed 
investors, reported wage income is subject to significant distortions since the portion of business 
income allocated to wages is a choice variable motivated by tax considerations. To overcome 
both problems we estimate an “expected wage rate” from a reduced form, generalized Mincer 
regression applied to just salaried workers, and then use the estimated coefficients from that 
regression to project an imputed wage rate for the self-employed.  In the “extended Mincer 
model”, we include EDU, EXP, EXP
2, GENDER, RACE, MARRIED, and HEALTH as 
regressors. The experience variable, EXP, may serve as an instrumental variable in this study 
since it is designed to measure experience in the labor market, not in asset management. 
We run separate regressions for the salaried and the self-employed individuals in both the 
baseline and alternative models partly to account for the use of an imputed wage variable for the 
latter group and partly because business assets account for a relatively large proportion of the   25
total portfolio of self-employed, and the latter assets are not included in our definition of 
securities that are tradable in a centralized exchange.  
Since our theoretical analysis assumes that all investors have positive expected demands 
for the risky asset, in our “baseline model” we have thus restricted the regressions to include 
individuals with positive net wealth and risky-asset holdings.  This restriction has the 
disadvantage, however, of excluding all the observations including zero holdings of both 
domestic and foreign securities. This limitation severely limits the sample size of especially 
salaried workers. Since only about 1/3 of the respondents report holding positive risky assets and 
only 20.8% of those hold foreign securities (of those 38% are salaried workers), we also run 
alternative regression specifications as robustness checks (see below). In terms of our theoretical 
model, zero holdings of tradable securities can be justified as corner solutions owing to fixed 
information and asset management costs. To allow for the inclusion of zero risky asset holdings, 
we also specify the dependent variable as log(1+RASST) in equation (11) [Model 2]. As an 
additional robustness test, we employ the selectivity bias method to account for the separate 
decision to hold zero securities, although our theoretical model does apply to this decision. 
Following proposition 1, equation (11) allows for two basic specifications: one that 
excludes WAGE in the regression, to allow for estimation of the theoretical “unconditional” 
effect of EDU on DEMAND, and one that includes WAGE to allow for conditional effects of 
both education and wage effects. It also allows distinguishing wage and salary workers from all 
investors by including the dummy variable SELF as a separate regressor. While the exact 
functional form of equation (11) cannot be pinned down theoretically, following EHY, we enter 
EDU in log form. Variables defined in continuous dollar values are also introduced in log form, 
while those defined as discrete variables are entered in natural form. Box-Cox analyses of optimal 
transformation strongly support this regression format.    26
A. Demand Regressions 
We first estimate our baseline model in equation (11) for 3 categories of risky assets: 
Total Risky Assets (TRA), Foreign Risky Assets (FRA), and Domestic Risky Assets (DRA). 
Since sample sizes are quite small annually, especially for salaried workers, we focus on a pooled 
regression model for all 6 annual data sets. In this specification, we restrict only the slope 
coefficients of lnEDU, lnWAGE* and lnTASST to be identical, allowing for both constant terms 
and the slope coefficients of all other regressors to vary across samples. The results are 
summarized in Table 1, where we report only the estimated coefficients of the model’s key 
variables. The full results are reported in Appendix B.   
The basic message we get from Table 1 is a solid confirmation of propositions 1-3.  In 
almost all cases, education significantly raises the demand for all asset categories. The only 
exceptions appear in the regression concerning the demand for foreign risky assets by salaried 
workers owing to its small sample size and the relatively small variability in the EDU variable in 
this subsample. The WAGE* variable unambiguously lowers the demand for risky assets, which 
is a key discriminating implication of our theoretical framework.  Moreover, the unconditional 
effect of education on the demand for the risky assets is lower in absolute value than its 
conditional effect where WAGE* is held constant, consistent with equation (7b) in proposition 1.   
We believe that the relatively weak impact of education on the demand for foreign risky 
assets stems mainly from the small sample size dictated by the logarithmic transformation we use 
for the dependent variable, which eliminates all observations with zero foreign assets.  Indeed, 
when we estimate equation (11) using Model 2 in which the alternative, monotonically related 
dependent variable is log (1+ RASST), the sample size increases significantly, especially in the 
foreign assets regression, where it expands about 5 folds. The results are listed in Table 1A.  In 
this table, the impact of our 3 basic variables becomes significant at the 1% significance level, 
confirming all of our testable hypotheses in all regressions.   27
As a further robustness test, we apply a sample selection model as an alternative 
approach for incorporating observations with zero risky asset holdings.  Specifically, we run the 
probit model in the selection stage using the same set of regressors as in equation (11) to explain 
investors’ decision to hold positive amounts of domestic and foreign assets and then estimate the 
baseline regression model conditional of positive holdings of these risky assets.  These results are 
also listed in Table 1B.  Due to the small sample size for salaried workers, we only apply the 
sample selection model to all investors.  This application produces our expected education and 
wage effects for both domestic and foreign risky assets. 
B. Portfolio Concentration regressions (individual home bias) 
To estimate the implications of proposition 2 concerning optimal portfolio concentrations 
in home securities, we use two alternative definitions of individual home bias (HB).  Adopting 
our regression specification for the demand for risky assets in equation (11), we run the following 
regression specification:  
(12)  HB =  a0 + a1lnEDU + a2lnTASST+ |a3lnWAGE*| + a4AGE + a5 PROF + a6RAV  
+|a7 SELF|.  
As in section A, we run the regression by pooling all 6 data sets together, but allowing intercepts 
and slope coefficients of AGE, PROF, RAV, and SELF to vary across years.   
  The basic definition we use to run the portfolio concentration regression is HB
0 = 
log(1+DRA/TRA) - the logarithm of 1 plus the ratio of domestic risky assets (DRA) to all risky 
assets (TRA).  Note that HB
0 is a monotonic transformation of HB’ = DRA/TRA used to derive 
proposition 2 and should then account for this measure as well.  We adopt HB
0 as our first 
measure in order to maximize the sample size since this transformation allows us to incorporate 
observations with zero DRA but also experiment with HB’ = DRA/TRA, as a robustness check.   
The results for this inclusive specification are summarized in Table 2, and those for the 
robustness checks are summarized in Table 2A. As proposition 2 indicates, the impact of the 
education variables at the individual investor level are generally ambiguous. While the general   28
prediction is that the HB measure would be an inverted-U-shaped function of our schooling 
variable, for a country like the US, where the schooling level of the investors in our sample is 
relatively high, we expect to observe mainly the downward sloping segment of the HB trajectory 
(see Figure 1 in section 4). Indeed, our results for both definitions of the home bias variable are 
consistent with this conjecture: the schooling coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% 
level. More important, our discriminating implication concerning the impact of the lnWAGE* 
variable is also confirmed, since its coefficient has the opposite sign of that of the schooling 
variable as proposition 3 suggests. These results are also significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, 
the conditional education effect, holding WAGE* constant, is larger in magnitude than the 
corresponding unconditional one, as predicted by proposition 1.  
The portfolio size variable appears to have generally insignificant effects in Table 2, 
largely perhaps because of the role this variable is playing in our regressions. Since our 
theoretical model rules out pure wealth effects, we have justified the inclusion of TASST in 
equations (11) and (12) as an technological variable accounting for economies of scale in 
information collection, or for trading experience and lower trading costs, since those with larger 
portfolios either inherit them or accumulate them through past investments. In Tables 1 and 1A 
we see that this variable has very similar effects in the regressions concerning home and foreign 
assets, which militates in favor of the second explanation. Thus, to the extent trading costs are 
similar for home and foreign assets, the coefficient of this variable should be insignificant in the 
home bias regressions.  
 
6. Macro-Level Evidence 
  In this section we test the basic implications of our model at the macro level using IMF 
and World Federation of Exchange data on the aggregate capitalized values of home and foreign 
stock holdings.  Since the financial data are available only in aggregate format, we can not 
construct a reasonable proxy for equity holdings per investor, because we do not have data on the   29
number of participating investors in each market. However, this problem does not exist for 
measures of relative holdings of domestic and foreign equities, since we can normalize the 
aggregate data by computing their ratios. We thus focus on “home bias” at the macro level. 
In implementing proposition 8 we attempt to test the following main hypotheses:  
(1) (Direct effects).  A country’s home bias is an inverted-U function of its own general human 
capital. Our numerical analysis suggests that the upward sloping part of the trajectory is brief, 
occurring around very low educational attainments.  Since our data are from developed countries, 
we may capture the downward-sloping portion of the trajectory in the upper panel of Figure 2. 
(2) (Cross effects). A country’s home bias is an inverted-U function of general human capital in 
the foreign country. Our numerical analysis indicates that this curve has a longer upward sloping 
portion around the same range of years of schooling. Our estimated cross effects may thus capture 
the upward-sloping portion of the trajectory (see the lower panel in figure 2).  
(3) (Wage and portfolio size effects). We expect the country’s average wage measure, to the 
extent it effectively accounts for opportunity costs of time in non-market activities, to have an 
opposite sign to that of the education effect. We also expect the estimated impact of education on 
home bias to be larger in absolute magnitude when the wage measure is used as a regressor 
relative to the case when the wage measure is not controlled for. Consistently with our micro-
level regressions we are also using GDP per-capita as a rough proxy for portfolio size, to account 
for potential economies of scale which reduces transaction and trading costs  involved in asset 
management.  
We use the following regression specifications to test our main hypotheses:  








(13a) equation (13) + b×other control variables 
Equation (13) is our “baseline model”, as it aims to test the implications of our theoretical 
model assuming that the financial markets in our sample are fully integrated. Equation (13a)   30
allows for additional controls to correct for deviations from this assumption. We construct our 
dependent variable HomeBias using equation (10) based on CAPM and ACT, which in turn are 
constructed from cross equity holdings and market capitalizations.  The cross-country equity 
portfolio holding is collected from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) while the market capitalization is obtained from the time 
series database of the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE).  Based on data availability, we 
construct a sample of 23 countries covering 7 years from 2001 to 2007.  The 23 countries are 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, South Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.  These 23 countries account for about 
80% of the capitalized value of the WFE database.  Country k’s CAPM in year t is constructed as 
∑ = =
23
1 , , , /
s t s t k t k Mcap Mcap CAPM , where  t k Mcap ,  denotes the capitalized value of country 
k’s stock market in year t. while its ACT in year t is defined as the fraction of its domestic stocks 
in its total stock holdings in year t. 
We use “average schooling years of total population aged 25 and over as of 1999 
(TYR99)” taken from Barro and Lee (2000) as a measure of general human capital, EDU
d.  Our 
results are robust to the choice of alternative measures by Barro and Lee (2000), such as the 
average schooling of male population 25 years and over.  However, our schooling variable is not 
available on an annual basis over our sample period. We believe that this constraint should not 
affect our results significantly.  First, we note that the distributions of average years of schooling 
in 1999 and 1995 are almost identical - the correlation coefficient is 0.99.  We thus expect the 
cross-sectional distribution of average years of schooling to remain very similar over our sample 
period.  Second, we find that the explanatory power of our regressions comes mostly from the 
cross-sectional variations as both our qualitative results and our measured R
2 from
  annual 
regressions we conducted as a robustness check are almost the same as in our pooled regressions.     31
  In order to estimate cross effects of our main explanatory variables, EDU, WAGE*, 
and GDPPC, we need to control for measures of these variables in “foreign” market 
corresponding to each country as well as in the domestic market. We construct the “foreign 
education” variable, EDU
f, e.g., as a weighted average of schooling years for all countries except 
the k-th country, using the corresponding market capitalizations as weights. We use the same 
method to compute all other “foreign” regressors. 
  Unlike our micro-level sample, we do not have data related to the opportunity cost of 
time of actual equity holders in different countries. We are confined to use instead data on the 
average hourly rate of the population. The Bureau of Labor Statistics offers a measure defined as 
the ‘international (real) hourly wage rate of the manufacturing sector’.  However, this measure 
does not represent the wage rate applicable to the population of salaried investors in each country, 
nor can it serve as a good indicator of the opportunity cost of time of self-employed investors, 
whose ownership of equities also varies across different countries. Another concern is the 
possibility of inconsistent treatment of fringe benefits in computing an international wage rate.  
To correct for these problems we use instead a projected international wage derived from a 
Mincerian regression model, (as in Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 2002). The equation we 
use, constrained by data availability for all countries in our sample, is the basic Mincer regression  
() t k t k t k k t k error EXP b EXP b EDU b a w ,
2
, 2 , 1 0 , ) ( log + + + + =  
where EDUk is country k’s average education as of 1999 and EXPk,t is a proxy for the work 
experience of the representative investor in country k at time t.  As in Yamarik, 2008, we compute 
EXPk,t by subtracting EDUk from the country’s average life expectancy at time t, which we take 
from the World Bank database.   
  We run our baseline regression model (13) including and excluding WAGE*, to compare 
the unconditional and conditional effects of education. We apply the regression model to the 
pooled cross-sectional samples for all 7 years after adding year dummies.  As a robustness check,   32
we also run the model using only the subsample of OECD countries. The estimated regression 
coefficients are summarized in Table 3.  
  The results of the baseline regression model in Table 3 support proposition 8 and our 
three tested macro-level hypotheses.  A country’s average education level always lowers its home 
bias, as anticipated in the upper panel of figure 2 of section 4, and the magnitude of the impact, 
conditional on wage rate, is always significant at the 1% level (the t-values are constructed from 
White’s robust standard errors). Also, the elasticity of the education effect conditioned on the 
wage rate is larger in absolute magnitude than the unconditional elasticity.  This supports the 
basic hypothesis of the model about the enhancing effect of education on private information 
precision. The estimated cross effects of the conditional and unconditional impacts of average 
education in the relevant foreign subsets on home bias are statistically insignificant.  One reason 
may be that they apply to the flat portion of the trajectory of the cross effects in the lower panel of 
figure 2. The impact of an economy’s projected wage rate on home bias is always opposite to that 
of the country’s education variables.  In particular, the country’s own wage rate always lowers its 
home bias, contrary to the impact of the country’s education level, reflecting what we generally 
ascribe to the impact of the opportunity costs of asset management on the level of private 
information precision in its own country, and the estimated coefficient is significant at the 5% 
level.  In contrast, the foreign wage effect is negative and significant, consistent with the cross 
effects of our basic determinants of asset management. The country’s own per-capital GDP 
lowers home bias in conformity with our third hypothesis, while its foreign counterpart turns out 
to be statistically insignificant. These effects may indeed reflect the impact of “portfolio size” in 
our micro-level regressions.  The fact that the results hold for both the full sample and the OECD 
subsample indicates the robustness of our findings. 
  It is also noteworthy that the regression line showing the correlation between our 
empirical home-bias measure and average schooling attainments, estimated from equation (13),   33
bears a very strong resemblance to the corresponding theoretical trajectory, as simulated in Figure 
2. In Figure 3, the two trajectories look quite congruent.  
  In addition to the baseline regression model, we have also estimated the expanded 
regression model (13a) by additional control variables which are frequently used in the 
international finance literature to account for factors that enhance integration, although these are 
only loosely connected to our model. They include: M/G
d and M/G
f  – domestic and foreign 
market capitalizations relative to their respective GDPs; LONG – the longitudinal difference 
between domestic and foreign stock exchanges; EU, ENGLISH and SPANISH – dummy 
variables distinguishing EU countries and countries where the dominant language is English or 
Spanish.  The results are reported in Appendix Table B3. 
  The results of the baseline model concerning the conditional and unconditional education 
effects are robust to the inclusion of additional controls in the expanded model. The same holds 
for the effect of the GDPPC. The qualitative effects of the projected wage rates remain the same 
but the impact of the country’s own wage becomes statistically insignificant. A shortcoming of 
this variable may be both the quality of international data on average wage rates and the fact that, 
unlike the wage data in our micro-level regressions, which reflect the wage rates associated with 
the actual investors, the BLS average wage rate reflects that of manufacturing workers. Another 
constraint is the relatively small size of our pooled sample. The impact of the additional controls 
generally confirms previous findings, but not all are statistically significant.
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7. Additional Inferences Concerning the Observed Diversity in Home Bias 
A. Alternative hypotheses 
Are the findings in our paper also consistent with alternative hypotheses involving 
overlooked diversification motives?  This can be assessed on two alternative assumptions.  
If human capital is a safe asset, as we assume in this model, optimal diversification in an   34
extended portfolio, including both traded and non-traded assets, would create a tendency 
to hold more risky financial assets (see EHY, 2008). This alternative hypothesis rests on a 
positive human wealth effect. But our consistent finding is that higher wages lower 
individuals’ absolute demand for all risky assets (section 5).  Indeed, the wage rate effect 
is consistently estimated to have an opposite sign of that of education. 
  Alternatively, if human capital were a risky asset, its impact on  domestic v. 
foreign assets at the macro level would depend essentially on the estimated covariance of 
the wage rate and the return on domestic assets,  ( ) d d w , cov μ . The literature reports 
contradicting findings, some suggesting a positive correlation, which should exacerbate 
the home bias puzzle (see, e.g., Baxter and Jermann, 1997), while others finding the 
opposite correlation (e.g., Bottazzi, Pesenti and Van Wincoop, 1996). A later study 
(Pesenti and Van Wincoop, 2002) finds that the hedge against human capital explains 
only a small portion of home bias.  Neither of these studies accounts, however, for the 
pattern of the home-bias trajectory as a function of conditional increments in schooling, 
or the opposite effects of schooling and the wage rate on home bias we predict and 
confirm empirically. 
B. Information costs 
Our model ascribes the observed concentration in domestic assets to the relative 
information advantage the representative investor in country d has about home asset d 
over the foreign asset f. This advantage can be stated in terms of the differential 
information cost the representative investor would have to bear in order to achieve the 
same level of private information precision concerning the two assets, i.e., Sd,d = Sd.f. By 
equation (1c) defined for country d’s investor, the information cost incurred in managing 
each asset is given by  ( ) ( ) 0 , , , k k d i k d C S q w S C + =  , where  ( ) [ ]
1 3 2 / 1
, 0 , , , /
θ θ θ
k d d k d k d H AH S S q = is   35
the time input involved in managing asset k = d,f. If we set the fixed cost of management 
to zero (Ck,0 = 0), the opportunity cost that agent d would incur from achieving the same 
private information for the foreign relative to the home asset would be  ( ) ( ) d d f d S C S C , , / =  
1 3 /
, , ) / (
θ θ
f d d d H H , i.e., agent d’s relative home-asset information advantage raised to the 
power (θ3/ θ1). This represents the maximal value of the cost differential required to 
explain home bias as an outcome of optimal asset management. If Ck,0 >0, the required  
cost differential would be less than 
1 3 /
, , ) / (
θ θ
f d d d H H . 
A partially-calibrated numerical exercise allows us to gain insight about the 
numerical value of the actual cost differential, based on the empirically observed pattern 
of home bias of the “representative investor”. Applying the set of parameters used in 
Figures 1 an d 2, with r=.25, we search for ratio of specific human capital endowments 
) / ( , , f d d d H H which produces a simulated trajectory of home bias in country d as a 
function of Hd,0  which closely resembles the pattern of the corresponding trajectory of 
home bias we observe empirically, as depicted by the regression line estimated from 
Table 3 for the full sample.  
The representative investor’s differential cost value 
1 3 /
, , ) / (
θ θ
f d d d H H , however, 
depends on the distribution of investors it represents. In a scenario in which all investors 
are homogeneous (“scenario 1”), we estimate the specific human capital endowment ratio 
) / ( , , f d d d H H which produces a simulated trajectory closely resembling our empirically 
estimated regression line to be 6 (see the dotted line in Fig. A.1). With θ3/ θ1 assumed to 
be 2, the differential cost estimate becomes 6
2 = 36. This differential, however, grossly 
overstates the relevant cost differential because investors are quite heterogeneous.  
The US-based micro-level data used in section 5 suggest that 79% of investors 
with positive risky assets hold just domestic assets (group 1) while 21% hold foreign   36
assets as well (group 2). The respective portfolio shares of groups 1 and 2 in the US 
portfolio of risky assets are 60% and 40%, respectively. The large size of group 1 thus 
reduces significantly the estimated specific human capital endowment ratio that is 
required to explain the average home bias exhibited by group 2. If this distribution of 
groups 1 and 2 is representative of all markets (“scenario 2”), our method of assessing the 
value of  ) / ( , , f d d d H H  that is required to explain the observed home bias trajectory 
across international financial markets would be 2, which makes the cost differential 
needed to explain the observed pattern of home bias across the observed international 
sample equal to 2
2 = 4.  (See Appendix C for a detailed computational account.) This 
exercise suggests that the cost differential which accounts for the observed level and 
pattern of home bias across international financial markets may be surprisingly low.   
 
Concluding remarks 
The basic innovation in this paper is the treatment of private information about risky 
assets and the “price information content" of corresponding asset prices as endogenous variables 
that are influenced by human capital endowments.  Our theoretical analysis and empirical 
findings indicate that this may be a promising approach for understanding systematic variations in 
portfolio choices across individuals and diversities in portfolio concentrations across markets.  
Our model produces a set of testable propositions concerning the impact of measures of 
benefits and costs of asset management on absolute and relative demand for domestic and foreign 
assets. The tests we conduct using 8 annual micro-level SCF national probability samples of 
individual investors in the US, and 7 annual macro-level IMF and World Federation of Exchange 
data on international financial markets are consistent with our theoretical analysis.    37
Our propositions are subject to strong assumptions, especially our treatment of international 
financial markets as fully integrated. We are clearly aware of the existence of capital constraints, 
regulations, and constraints on trade which impede the openness of international financial 
markets, and which our analysis has not attempted to capture. Yet this is also the strength of our 
model and empirical analyses, which focus on the power of our basic theoretical constructs to 
explain systematic diversities in “home bias” while employing limited controls. 
Despite the limitations of the data, our basic findings are shown to be generally robust to 
the introduction of various controls such as professional and occupational affiliations and self-
reported attitudes toward risk at the micro level, and commonality of language and geographical 
proximity at the market level, in explaining systematic variations in both “individual home bias” 
and “macro-level home bias”. This indicates that our model may indirectly contribute to the 
assessment of the roles of regulatory constrains and barriers to trade in financial and currency 
markets, and increase our understanding of the performance of these markets.  In particular, our 
study suggests that educational attainments and opportunity costs of information acquisition need 
to be accounted for in attempts to assess the role of regulatory constraints and policy variables. 
The analysis in this paper also offers a unifying approach to deal with other market-level 
characteristics we have only touched upon in this paper. For example, our model has direct 
implications concerning the degree to which international financial markets are “disconnected” 
with fundamentals such as the basic implications of CAPM, as a consequence of variations in the 
degree to which prices are actually “information revealing”. Indeed, we show that such 
“disconnect”, as indicated by variations in home bias across international markets, can be 
accounted for by fairly mild levels of information-cost advantage enjoyed by domestic investors 
concerning home, relative to foreign assets, as our illustration in section 7.B indicates. The model 
can be extended to explain phenomena like “flight to quality” during times of market distress, 
which we can link with a decline in the price information content of risky assets. It has direct 
implications concerning variability in the magnitude of risk premiums across markets. It can also   38
help explain the pattern of volatility contagion across international markets, e.g., by identifying 
which markets have been more susceptible to the recent financial crisis in the US. And although 
in this paper we have focused on the model’s ability to explain variability in “home bias”, it can 
be applied to address apparent diversities in asset holdings across industries and geographical 
units within an economy. Last but not least, our work attempts to expand the scope of issues in 
the “new information economy” where human capital theory can provide new insights.  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Direct inputs may include purchase of informational services from analysts or brokers, which we do not 
model in this paper, but this does not affect any of our results since heterogeneous analysts offer 
information signals of varying precision. Searching for good analysts and monitoring their performance is 
part of what we call asset management. Thus, unlike studies where purchased financial services are final 
inputs in the production of private information (see, e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer 1990 and Veldkamp 2006), 
in our approach investors draw independent inferences from information obtained from sellers.  
2 For example, the Morgan Stanley Capital International index for the All Country World Index 
(MSCI/ACWI)) render opportunities to hold a value weighted global index fund capturing about 85% of 
the world market at 0.35% of net asset value per year.  
3 Our model’s basic solution and inferences do not rely on the independence of μ ~  and x ~  or the 
diagonality of Σx. The former can be replaced with the the milder assumption that μ ~  and x ~  are 
imperfectly correlated (see Admati, 1985).  We assume that Σx is a diagonal matrix to simplify the 
exposition of the analytical proofs of some of our market level propositions.  
4 The compactness of the set is one of the necessary conditions for proving the existence of rational-
expectation equilibrium. 
5  La Porta et al. (1998) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) have emphasized the importance of these 
factors in portfolio decisions. 
 
6 λi accounts for job-specific factors affecting individual wages, such as job training or work experience. 
Ck,0 incorporates fixed costs of analysts or trading costs which are common to all investors, but can also be 
influenced by one’s portfolio size owing to economies of scale in information production and asset trading.  
7 A simple extension of our model can allow for diversity in both risk tolerance and specific human capital.  
 
8 Put differently, PIC, which Verrecchia (1982) calls “price informativeness”, accounts for the difference 
between the variance of the risky returns that is conditional on both private and implicit public signals, 
() ()
1 1 2 1 , ~ − − − Σ + + Σ = S S r S P z Var x i i μ μ , rather than just a private signal   ( ) ()
1 1 ~ − − + Σ = i i S z Var μ μ . 
9 For proof see, for instance, Admati (1985).  The solutions we derive also indicate why investors must 
generally recognize that the observed prices are subject to supply noises, i.e.,  0 2 ≠ φ  in equation (3a). If 
0 = 2 φ , then () 0
1
1 φ φ μ − =
− P  by (3a). Since rational investors know  0 φ and 1 φ , the observed prices 
would become fully revealing of available private information, eliminating the incentive to engage in costly 
asset management. 
 
10  Equation (6a) is a natural extension of EHY (2008) and Verrecchia (1982). Note that each investor’s 
optimal precision Si is a function of Vi,kk, which in turn (see equation 4b) is a function of the average 
precision  S. Since the latter represents the aggregation of individual asset management, equilibrium 
requires their mutual consistency. We can also prove the existence of information equilibrium in this 
framework. 
 
11  f i d i D D , , /  is a suitable measure of the cross-sectional variation in the portfolio concentration at the 
individual level within countries, as equilibrium prices and total market capitalization are constant across 
individuals, and  the measure is also monotonically related to  ) /( , , , f i d i d i D D D + .   42
                                                                                                                                                 
  
12 Although by equation (1a), a higher Hi,0 lowers both the level and slope of the marginal cost schedule  of 
“managing” asset d relative to asset f, the impact on optimal information precision is ambiguous, since it 
depends on the difference in the levels and slopes of the respective marginal revenue schedules in equation 
(6b), except at sufficiently high levels of Hi,0, where we can prove that ( ) 0 / 0 , , , > ∂ − ∂ i f i d i H S S .  See 
Appendix A.3. 
. 
13 Note that PICk  ≡ kk Δ  is a quadratic function of average information precision, SA,k. Even a small rise in 
the average schooling level in country d,  raising SA,d , can thus produce a much larger increase in PICd. 
 
14 By proposition 1, a conditional increase in 0 , d H  always increases PICd and the domestic investor’s 
information advantage about both domestic and foreign securities, but it may not always increase PICf . 
Specifically if  f d H ,  is nil or close to nil and  0 , d H  is relatively low, an increase in  0 , d H  and PICd would 
induce a lower  f A S , , since we can show that  0 / , ≤ Δ ∂ ∂ dd f i S  for all i (see appendix A.5). A continued 
decline in PICf  when Hd,0 rises, however, increases the marginal benefit of managing the foreign asset for 
all investors,  ff i V , , so  f A S ,  and PICf must eventually increase with  0 , d H . Our extensive simulations show 
that both PICd and PICf are monotonically increasing functions of  0 , d H  for positive values of  f d H , . 
 
15 The assumption  0 ≥ df V  in the two-country case is natural since it implies that expected excess 
returns on the countries’ risky assets are positive. This is because  ]
~ ~ [ d d P E − μ =( ) f df d dd x V x V +  and 
]
~ ~ [ f f P E − μ =( ) f ff d df x V x V + . We implicitly invoke the assumption that both  0 ≥ df V  and 
( ) 0 ≥ Σ
df μ , since we expect both risky assets to command a positive risk premium under any given 
relative values of expected supplies,  d x  and  f x . 
 
16 By symmetry, our measure of domestic “home bias” ( f d d d D D , , / ) or HomeBiasd in equation (10) is an 
inverted-U-shaped functions of country f’s general human capital, Hf,o. Note that since the average 
schooling levels in countries with developed stock markets are typically high, the empirically observed 
segments of the home bias measures depicted in the upper panel of figures 2 may capture mostly the 
downward-sloping segments of the inverted-U-shaped curves. In the lower panel of figure 2, in contrast, 
depicting the “cross effects” of a higher Hd,0 on country f’s corresponding “home bias” measures, the 
inflection point occurs at a considerably higher level of average schooling. Empirically, then, the observed 
segments of the home bias measure in the lower panel of Figure 2 may be upward sloping.     
 
17As checks for robustness of our regression specifications, we also run the baseline and expanded models 
by using projected wage rates from an extended Mincer regression model by including both sex ratios (the 
ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education) and infant mortality rates as additional 
instrument variables.  The results are reported in Appendix Tables B4 and B5.  These results are consistent 
with the ones reported in the text.  As additional robustness tests, we have employed an alternative measure 
of average schooling attainments, based on Cohen and Soto (2007) in addition to the Barro and Lee 
measure in all regressions, and an alternative wage rate measure computed by OECD, in addition to our 





Table 1: Demand for Domestic and Foreign Risky Assets 





































N   3153  3112  509 
All Investors 






























N   6444  6356  1340 
 
Notes: The regression model is equation (11). “Unconditional” refers to the regression excluding 
the WAGE* regressors.  “Conditional” refers to the regression including them.  The numbers in 
parentheses are t-ratios. 
  
Table 1A:  Demand for Domestic and Foreign Risky Assets: Alternative Transformation 
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All Investors 




















N   6444  6444 
 
See notes to Table 1. 
 
Table 1B:  Demand for Domestic and Foreign Risky Assets: Sample Selection Model for All 
Investors 
 
    Domestic Risky Assets  Foreign Risky Assests 




















N   6356  1340 
 
See notes to Table 1. 
  
Table 2: Portfolio Concentration (Individual “Home Bias”) Regression Results 
    HB = log(1+DRA/TRA) 
   All  Salaried 




















N   6444  3153 
 
Notes: The regression model is equation (12). “Unconditional” refers to the regression excluding 
the WAGE* regressors.  “Conditional” refers to the regression including them.  The numbers in 
parentheses are t-ratios. 
 
Table 2A: Portfolio Concentration Regression Results using Alternative HB Measure 
    HB’ = DRA/TRA 
   All  Salaried 




















N   6444  3153 
 
See notes to Table 2.  
Table 3  Home Bias Regression at the Macro Level: Baseline Model 
  Full Sample  OECD Sample 















































N  148 148 126 126 
Adjusted R
2  0.4192 0.5111 0.5452 0.6620 
 
Notes: The Baseline model is equation (13). “Unconditional” refers to the regression excluding 
the WAGE* regressors.  “Conditional” refers to the regression including them.  The numbers in 
parentheses are t-ratios constructed from robust standard errors. 
  
 
Figure 1: Impact of the general human capital of country d's investor on relative info. 
advantage, PIC, excess returns, and absolute demands for home and foreign assets. 































Average schooling attainments in country d, Hd,0
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Figure 2: Impact of the general human capital of country d's investor on measures of 
relative demand for the home asset and home bias. 




















Average schooling attainments in country d, Hd,0
Direct effects on portfolio concentrations in home asset (d)
 
 



































Average schooling attainments in country d, Hd,0
Cross effects on portfolio concentrations in home asset (f)
 
 


















Based on the same set of parameters as in figure 1 
  






















































































Average schooling attainments in country d, Hd,0
Measures of portfolio concentrations in home assets (d)
 
 

















The lower panel is based on parameters in Figure 1 
  
 
Figure A.1: The equilibrium cost differential under scenarios 1 and 2 


























Average schooling attainments in country d, Hd,0
 
  Baseline Regression
Hd,d=6:   Scenario 1
Hd,d=2.1: Scenario 2
 



















x ,  5 . 0 1 = θ ,  1 3 2 = =θ θ ,  r = 1/4 , A = 1,   5 . 0 / / = = N N N N f d  
 
The simulated plots are parallel shifted by 7 to the right.  
  
Appendix A: Mathematical Appendix 
A.1 Asset Market Equilibrium 
From Admati (1985), the market price has an equilibrium solution as follows: 
x P ~ ~ ~
2 1 0 φ μ φ φ − + =   almost surely,  
where  ( ) x rS V x
1 1
0
− − Σ + Σ = μ φ μ ,    ( ) S S r S V x
1 2
1
− Σ + = φ ,    ( )
1 1
2
− − Σ + = x rS I r V φ   and  
()
1 1 2 1 − − − Σ + + Σ = S S r S V x μ  
The investor i’s posterior forecast about the return, μ ~, is normal with its mean and 
variance as follows: 
[] P z P z E i i i i i 2 1 0 , ~ η η η μ + + =  and   [ ] ( )
1 1 2 1 , ~ − − − Σ + + Σ = = S S r S P z Var V x i i i μ μ  
where  () {} ( ) x rS rI rS I V x x i i
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− − Σ = φ η x i i S rV . 
 
A.2 Proof of equation (6a)  
By substituting the optimal conditional demand for risky assets,  ( ) P rV D i i i
~ ~ 1 − =
− μ , into 
the first stage problem, we derive the following: 
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where  0 x  and  0 B  denote investor i’s initial endowment of risky assets and safe bond, 
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z P . 
Taking the differentiation of the object function in (A.1)’ with respect to  k i S ,  and using 
kk i i k i i V S M S S M , , / = ∂ ∂ , ,
1
1 11 i z S = Ω = +
− λ ω i S − = + 2 21 λ ω ,   , 0 / , = ∂ ∂ k i P S t  
, 0 / , = ∂ Ω ∂ k i P S  and  () { } 0 / , 6 3
1
1 11 3 = ∂ − + ∂
−
k i
T S λ λ λ ω λ , we prove the result. QED 
 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1. 
Taking partial differentiation of (6a) with respect to the general human capital,  0 , i H , 



















































































where  Y X , ε  denotes the elasticity of X with respect to Y. 
As  i V  is covariance matrix,  ( ) 0
2
, , , > − df i ff i dd i V V V .  Hence, the sign of  0 , , / i d i H S ∂ ∂  
depends on the sign of  
0 , , 1 2 /
i i H w ε θ θ − .  A conditional increase in Hd,0 at a given wage 
level (i.e. 
0 , , i i H w ε =0)  increases  d i S ,  more than the unconditional increase in Hd,0.   By 
equation (5a) and the large economy assumption, it is straightforward to see 
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where  () ( ) 0 / / 2 / 0 , , 1 2
2
0 0 , > − = i H w H r
i i ε θ θ χ  and  0
2
, , , > − = df i ff i dd i V V V V D . 
Thus,  ( ) 0 / 0 , , , > ∂ − ∂ i f i d i H S S , if  ff i dd i V V , , <  and  f i d i S S , , > . QED 
 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4  
Without loss of generality, we prove it for  d i H , . Taking differentiation of first order 
conditions with respect to  ,1 i H  and applying Cramer’s rule on it, we derive the following:  



















































because the expression in the square bracket is negative given that  ) /( , ,
2
d i d i H S C ∂ ∂ ∂  <0 
by (1a)~(1c).   Similarly, it can be shown that   























where the equality holds when  0 , = df i V .  Since investor i’s average demand for risky 
asset k, E[Di,k], is proportional to Si,k, at the individual level the concentration ratio 
( ) f i d i D D , , /  increases in  d i H , . QED 
 
A.5 Lemmas to prove Proposition 5 
Lemma 1: (The impact of PIC). The price information content (PIC) of asset k lowers 
optimal asset management and private information precision concerning this asset, i.e., 
0 / , < Δ ∂ ∂ kk k i S  for all investors.  Also,   0 / , ≤ Δ ∂ ∂ ll k i S  for   l k ≠  where equality holds 
when 0 , = df i V .   
Proof.  (WLOG, we prove it for  dd Δ  only) Taking differentiation of (6a) with respect to 
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df i ff i dd i V V V V D − = . The result follows.  QED. 
 
Denote  ( ) 0 , 1 i H F  and ( ) f i d i H H F , , 2 ,  as marginal distributions for specific and general 
human capital applied to the world investors.  We place a hat to denote new distributions: 
() 0 , 1 ˆ
i H F  and  () f i d i H H F , , 2 , ˆ  are first order stochastic shifts of ( ) 0 , 1 i H F  and ( ) f i d i H H F , , 2 ,.  
  
Lemma 2: A first order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of general human 
capital increases the PIC of at least one asset (either  dd Δ  or  ff Δ  or both). 
Proof.  Suppose otherwise.  In other words, a FOSD shift in the distribution of general 
human capital lowers both PICd and PICf.  Then, by Lemma 1, the new equilibrium 
functions of individual asset management  d i S , ˆ  and  f i S , ˆ  are higher than the initial levels, 
d i S ,  and  f i S , , for a given  i H .  Therefore,  
()() () ()() ()
()() () dd dd x i f i d i H i d i
dd x i f i d i H i d i dd x i f i d i H i d i dd
H F H H F H S
H F H H F H S H F H H F H S
i
i i















ˆ ) ( ˆ d , ˆ d ˆ
) ( d , d ˆ ) ( d , d
1
2
0 , 1 , , 2 ,
1
2
0 , 1 , , 2 ,
1
2
0 , 1 , , 2 ,
which is a contradiction of the initial assumption,  dd dd Δ < Δ ˆ . QED 
 
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5 
Suppose otherwise.  If both PICd and PICf fall, it is contradiction by Lemma 2 Error! 
Reference source not found.because an increase in Hd,0 is trivially a FOSD shift in the 
distribution of general human capital. If an increase in  0 , d H  lowers PICd (and SA,d) and 
increases PICf (and SA,f), it is a contradiction too, because  f d d d H H , , > .  QED. 
 
In general PICf  also increases as Hd,0 increases because the magnitude of  dd f i S Δ ∂ ∂ / , ≤0 
is of second order:  To see the mechanism, a rise in  0 , d H  increases both  d d S ,  and  f d S , , 
raising both PICd and PICf . This in turn erode  d i S ,  and  f i S ,  for all investors by Lemma 1. 
However, the feedback effect cannot exist without the initial rise in PICs.  Therefore, 
PICf  is likely to increase in equilibrium unless the negative feedback effect of 
dd f i S Δ ∂ ∂ / ,  is large. 
 
  
Appendix B: Full Regression Results 
Table B1: (Conditional) Demand for Risky Assets 
  All Investors  Salaried Workers 






















































































































































































See notes to Table 1.  
Table B1 (Conditional) Demand for Risky Assets (Continued) 
  All Investors  Salaried Workers 


























































































































































































   
N  6444 6356 1340 3153 3112  509 
 
See notes to Table 1. 
  
Table B2 Regression Results for Home Bias 
  HB = DRA/TRA  HB=log(1+DRA/TRA) 


























































































































See notes to Table 2. 
  
Table B2 Regression Results of Home Bias (Continued) 
  HB = DRA/TRA  HB=log(1+DRA/TRA) 































































































































N  6444 3153 6444 3153 
 
See notes to Table 2. 
  
Table B3: Home Bias at the Macro Level: Expanded Model 
Expanded Model Using Projected Wages from Baseline Mincer Regressions 
  Full Sample  OECD Sample 

































































































N  148 148 126 126 
Adjusted R
2  0.6353 0.6627 0.8591 0.8680 
 
Notes: The expanded model includes our additional control variables. “Unconditional” refers to 
the regression excluding the WAGE* regressors.  “Conditional” refers to the regression including 
them.  The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios constructed from robust standard errors. 
  
Table B4  Home Bias Regression at the Macro Level 
Baseline Model Using Projected Wages from Extended Mincer Regressions 
 
  Full Sample  OECD Sample 















































N  133 133 123 123 
Adjusted R
2  0.5148 0.6441 0.5471 0.6887 
 
Notes: The Baseline model is equation (13).  The extended Mincer regression includes sex ratios 
and infant mortality risks in addition to the basic Mincer regression. “Unconditional” refers to the 
regression excluding the WAGE* regressors.  “Conditional” refers to the regression including 
them.  The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios constructed from robust standard errors. 
  
Table B5  Home Bias Regression at the Macro Level 
Extended Model Using Projected Wages from Extended Mincer Regressions 
 
  Full Sample  OECD Sample 

































































































N  133 133 123 123 
Adjusted R
2  0.7635 0.7804 0.8622 0.8728 
 
Notes: The expanded model includes our additional control variables. The extended Mincer 
regression includes sex ratios and infant mortality risks in addition to the basic Mincer regression.  
“Unconditional” refers to the regression excluding the WAGE* regressors.  “Conditional” refers 
to the regression including them.  The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios constructed from robust 
standard errors. 
  
Appendix C – determining the equilibrium cost differential under scenario 2 
To gain insight about the equilibrium cost differential 
1 3 /
, , ) / (
θ θ
f d d d H H which is 
consistent with the observed trajectory of home bias as a function of general human 
capital (Hd,0) proxied by schooling, we pursue the following exercise, based the on micro-
level US data used in section 5. These data show that groups 1 and 2, as defined in 
section 7.A, account for 60% and 40% of the dollar value of US’s risky portfolio. In this 
case the share of domestic assets in the risky portfolio of the representative investor in the 
US (SR), and thus the US home bias measure, can be computed as  
(C.1) HBd = 0.6 HB1 + 0.4 HB2,  
where HBj (j=1,2) represents the share of domestic assets in the risky asset portfolio of 
groups 1 and 2, respectively. In the following exercise, we assume that the US shares of 
groups 1 and 2 in the risky portfolio are the same across all countries (thus country d). 
Since group 1 specializes in the domestic asset, the trajectory of the home-bias 
level of group 1 as a function of schooling is thus a flat curve at a value HB=1. To 
determine the corresponding home-bias trajectory of group 2, we pursue the same method 
discussed in Section 7.A under “scenario 1”. That is, we assume that group 2 consists of 
homogeneous investors, all holding equal shares of assets d and f. We then simulate our 
model numerically to derive trajectories of the home bias of group 2’s representative 
investor under alternative values the investor’s endowed information advantage 
( f d d d H H , , / ). For each trial value, we compute the home bias trajectory of the average 
investor in country d using equation (C.1). We then determine the equilibrium value of 
f d d d H H , , /  as the one producing the trajectory which most resembles the empirically 
observed trajectory in Figure (A.1), i.e., the estimated regression line based on Table 3 
for the full sample. This produces an equilibrium value of  f d d d H H , , / = 2.1. The maximal 
equilibrium cost differential explaining the observed trajectory of home bias is thus 4.4. 